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Abstract
In this paper non-convexity in economics has been revisited. Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem has been tested with the
asymmetric auctions where bidders follow log-concave probability distributions (non-convex preferences). Ten standard
statistical distributions have been used to describe the bidders’ behavior. In principle what is been tested is that equilibrium
price can be achieved where the sum of large number non-convex sets is convex (approximately), so that optimization is
possible. Convexity is thus very important in economics.
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1 Introduction
The Shapley-Folkman theorem places an upper bound on the size of the non-convexities (openings or holes)
in sum of non-convex sets in Euclidean, n− dimensional space as a function of the size on non-convexities in
the sets summed and the dimension of the space, as explanation given in(Starr 2016). The bound is based on the
size of non-convexities in the sets summed and the dimension of the space. When the number of sets in the sum
is large, then the bound is independent of the number of sets summed and is depending on n i.e. dimension of the
space. Than the size of non-convexity in the sum becomes relatively small as a proportion of the sets summed,
the non-convexity becomes zero as the number of demands becomes large as the summands become large. This
theorem is used to demonstrate the following properties: First, the existence of competitive equilibrium in large
finite economies (Second fundamental theorem also applies with finite agents or finite time periods) with non-
convex preferences. This is done by increasing marginal rate of substitution, that is by increasing the size of
the proportion of the prices of at least two goods, or one indivisible good, discrete goods that can be traded
only as a whole with at least two bidders. And second, this theorem is been used to demonstrate convergence
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to the set of competitive equilibria (Arrow and Hahn 1971). Further, the Shapley-Folkman lemma provides that
the sum of many sets is close to being convex. In this regard, the Shapley- Folkman theorem states a bound
on the distance between the Minkowski sum and its convex hull; this distance is zero if and only if the sum is
convex. A set of points is said to span a point, if a point can be expressed as a convex combination (weighted
average) of elements of the set of points. In case of a set of concavity of preferences, then some prices support
budget line that supports two optimal baskets of goods, and then the demand for goods is disconnected. So as
n− dimensions increases to infinity, 1/n times sum of sets goes to zero. In optimization this produces an upper
bound on the duality gap of separable non-convex optimization problems that involve finite sums (Aubin and
Ekeland 1976).
To prove this theorem, we apply practical approach by using Asymmetric auctions, where players are ran-
domly drawn to have different distributions and values. In this case bidder have log-concave distribution func-
tions. The results prove that under some circumstances equilibrium price is achieved, though that equilibrium
may be inefficient (high price) and non-existent (if convergence is not achieved). There exists literature in the
subject of asymmetric auctions (Maskin and Riley 2000, Fibich and Gavious 2003, Guth, Ivanova-Stenzel et al.
2005, Gayle and Richard 2008, Hubbard and Paarsch 2009, Fibich and Gavish 2011, Hubbard, Kirkegaard et al.
2013).
2 The Shapley-Folkman theorem
Shapley- Folkman theorem (Starr 1969), in economics is used to extend Minkowski sums of convex sets to
sums of general sets, which need not be convex (Skiena 2009):
∑(A
⊕
B) = {a+b : a ∈ A,b ∈ B} (1)
Where A and B are sets of location vectors or radius vectors. Shapley- Folkman theorem may be represented
this way:
Theorem 1. Lets suppose that x ∈ con(A1 + · · ·+AI), whereA ∈ RL, So we can write x = a1 + · · ·+ ai, where
ai ∈ conAi,∀i,ai ∈ Ai,∀L,(,∀i.a
Previous theorem originates from Carathéodory’s Fundamental Theorem (Eckhoff 1993): Each point in the
convex hull of a set S in Rn is in the convex combination of n+1 or fewer points of S. Convex hullb the is given
as:
con≡ {
N
∑
j=1
λ j p j : λ j ≥ 0∀ j,
N
∑
j=1
λ j = 1} (2)
Suppose that x ∈ conA, where A ∈ RL, ∃a1 . . . ,an+1 ∈ A, ∈ con(a1, . . . ,an+1). More convenient approach to the
statement of this theory is presented by Khan and Rath (Khan and Rath 2013):
Let RL be an L dimensional Euclidean space, then let Ai denote the its convex hull for anyA⊆ Rn, now /0 6= Ai ⊆
Rn and x ∈ con∑ni=1 Ai, then ∑ni=1 xi = x, and x ∈ conAi,∀i,xi ∈ Ai, for at least n−m indices of i.
Let Ψ = /0c, and then a,b ∈ Ψ→ a∪ b ∈ Ψ,a,b ∈ Ψ⇒ a\b ∈ Ψ. d This contains logical values (Boolean
Algebra), and one can define finitely additive measure µ : Ψ→ RL, i.e.µ(a∪b) = µ(a)+µ(b),whenever a,b ∈
Ψ,a∩b = /0. Partially ordered subset of partially ordered set i.e. supremum of µ is given as : sup{|µi(a)| : a ∈
Ψ} < ∞,1 ≤ i ≤ me, if m = 1 it is called finitely additive scalar measure. And we can define:|µ| = µ++ µ−.
A field Ψ is an F− algebra, i.e.F : Ψ→ Ψ is an endofunctor of category Ψ, then an F−algebra is a tuple
a conAi for a theory Ai means Ai is consistent
b A convex hull is the smallest polygon that encloses a group of objects, such as points.
c Ψ is a field of subsets.
d The relative complement of a with respect to a set b
e This is the least element in Ψ≥ ∀ai,bi
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(A,a), where A is an object of Ψ and a is isomorphism F(A)→ A. Ψ also is a F− algebra if for any increasing
sequence {An} and any decreasing sequence {Bn}, and An,Bn ∈Ψ,An ⊆ Bn,∀n,∃C ∈Ψ,An ⊆C⊆ Bn∀n (Seever
1968, Armstrong and Prikry 1981). Ψ also, is a σ -algebra if ∪∞n=1An ∈Ψ,An ∈Ψ, in such a case Ψ,(T,Ψ) is a
measurable space. EveryF−algebra is σ -algebra: if Ψ is a σ -algebra and if there is increasing sequence {An}
and decreasing sequence {Bn} a decreasing sequence both in Ψ and An ⊆ Bn,∀n, then ∪∞n=1An or ∪∞n=1Bn can be
in role of C. Now if so,µ :Ψ→ RL is an countably additive measure if µ( /0) = 0, and µ(∪∞n=1An) =∑ni=1 µ(An),
when {An} is a sequence of disjoint pairs of sets in Ψ. The measure µ purely atomic if there is scalar measure
λ such that λ  µ , and if λ (A) = 0, for every measurable set for which |µ|(A) = 0. And if there is a sequence
{Ek} such that T =∪∞k=1Ek,∀Ek ∈ ∀µi, i= 1, . . . ,m. This is called an atomic or only positive measure (Bogachev
2007, Aliprantis and Border 2013, Halmos 2013, Hewitt and Stromberg 2013). Proof of the theorem was most
simple in the one provided in (Zhou 1993):
Proof. Let x ∈ Co(A) has a representation x = ∑ni=1 yi and yi ∈ Co(Ai),∀i, and let yi = ∑ni=1 ai jyi j,ai j >
0,∑ni=1 ai j = 1,yi j ∈Ai. Constructed z vectors are given as: z=∑ni=1∑lj=1 bi jyi j,bi j ≥ 0, and (m+n)bi j ≥ 0.From
previous expression x = ∑ni=1∑
l
j=1 bi jyi j,bi j = 1,∀i. Now, x = ∑lj=1 bi jyi j,x = ∑ni=1 xi,xi ∈ Co(Ai),∀i.Because
there are (m+n)bi j ≥ 0 in total, there is at least one bi j ≥ 0,∀i, and there are at most m indices i that have more
than one bi j > 0, and xi ∈ Ai for at least (n−m) indices i. Preposition also here is continuous function (continuity
condition) i.e. the condition for continuity, where states that f is said to be continuous on Rl if (Robbin, Rogers
et al. 1987):
∀x0 ∈ Rl∀ε > 0∃δ > 0∀x ∈ Rl[|x− x0|< δ | ⇒ f (x)− f (x0)< ε|] (3)
Also, if there are n commodities, and a nonnegative orthant Θ of Euclidean spaceEn is introduced, then the sets
{x : xc y} and {x : yc x} are closed. Here c are preferences of a trader in a pure exchange economy (Starr
1969). The assumption of convexity assumes that if c y, then λx+(1− )xc y, this means that any weighted
average or convex combination of x and y is preferred to y,0≤ λ ≤ 1. Each trader has initial endowment bundle
and stars with a positive amount of some good xc > 0.
Now, will introduce spanability assumption. Let, ϑ ∈ Θ, and x ∈ Ac(ϑ),then there is a set of no more than
n+ 1 points xc of Ac(ϑ) and x = ∑λcxc, where λc ≥ 0, for all c, and ∑λc = 1. Spanability of functions is an
important concept in mathematical economics, further explained in Hüsseinov (Hüsseinov 1997):
Theorem 2. Spanability theorem: Let f : Rn→ R¯f is a lower semicontinuous bounded from below function such
that epigraph of a function given as,
epi( f ) = {(x,ϑ)|x ∈ X ,ϑ ∈ R, f (x)≤ ϑ} ⊂ Rn+1, g does not contain lines. We were that the function is convex
if its epigraph epi( f ) is convex set. And, furthermore x = ∑mi=1λcxc,∃xi, . . . ,xm ∈ Rn, and
∀(λ1, . . . ,λm)> 0,λ1+ · · ·+λm = 1, f ∗ (x) =
m
∑
i=1
λc f (xc).
hFunction would be spannable also in this corollary: lim
||x||→∞
f (x)
||x|| = ∞, then f is spannable.
3 Lyapunov theorem
The Shapley-Folkman theorem is a discrete counterpart to the Lyapunov theorem on non-atomic measure
(Starr 2016), Lyapunov theorem can be best presented as in by Grodal (Derigs 2009). Let is consider an economy
of finite non-negative atomless measures i.e.µ = (µ1, . . . ,µn) on the measurable space (A,A).In the previous
expressionA is a set of finite vector defined measures on V ,which represents a set of coalitions of consumers as in
f Here R¯ = R∪{−∞,+∞} affinely extended real numbers
g Epigraph or supergraph of a function f : Rn→ R is
h f∗ is the greatest lower semicontinuous convex.
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the works of Vind (Vind 1964). Here also V is a σ - field of subsets C. By, A¯0 is given the resource allocation (set
of possible allocations) in the economy {a ∈ A|anonatomic}. Then, the range of atomless measures is: R(µ) =
{x ∈ Rn|∃C ∈ A} where xh = µh(C),h = 1, . . . ,n, is a compact and convex subset of Rn. Lyapunov theorem is
used to make conclusions about the trajectories of the system x˙ = f (x). System is globally asymptotically stable
if x(t)→ xe, as t → ∞. System is locally asymptotically stable near or at xe, if there is an R > 0, subject to
||x(0)−xe|| ≤ R⇒ x(t)→ xe, t→ ∞. In previous expressions xe is an equilibrium point and xe ∈ Rn. Now some
function V : Rn→ R is positive and definite if: V (z) ≥ 0,∀z. Now if there is a nonlinear system x = f (x), and
function V : Rn → R, one can define; V˙ : Rn → R, and one can write: V˙ (z) = ∇V (z)T f (z), or dVdt (x(t)), when
z = x(t), and x˙ = f (x). Lyapunov theorem imply states that if there exist such function V : Rn→ R that satisfies
V and V˙ . Function V : Rn→ R is called Lyapunov function. Trajectories of this function are bounded from zero
to t. This can be written as:
V (x(t)) =V (x(0))+
ˆ t
0
V˙ (x(t))dτ (4)
About Lyapunov stability following conditions should apply: V˙ (z)< 0,∀z 6= 0, and V˙ (0) = 0, if z = 0. Proof of
this theorem assumes that x(t)→ 0, V˙ (x(t))→ ε , and ε > 0. And for ε following applies: ε ≤V (x(t))≤V (x(0)).
And a subset C is closed and bounded C = {z|ε ≤V (x(z))≤V (x(0))}. V˙ is also assumed to be continuous, and
supz∈CV˙ =−a < 0. And, since V˙ (x(t))<−a,∀t, one can rewrite Equation 4 (prethodo ravenstvo) as:
V (x(t)) =V (x(0))+
ˆ T
0
V˙ (x(t))dτ ≤V (x(0))−aT (5)
and since T >V (x(0))/a, and V (x(0))< 0, this means that x(t)→ 0, and that x˙ is globally asymptotically stable
(Brouwer 1912). Now if(T,0,µ) is a measurable space and 0 < µ(A)< µ(B), where A ∈ 0 and B ∈ 0,B⊂ A.
In previous expressions 0 is a σ -algebra, and the nonatomicity of µ is shown is equivalent to (Tardella 1990):
∀a ∈ [0,1],∀A ∈ 0,∃B ∈ 0,B⊂ A,µ(B) = aµ(A) (6)
The main idea of Lyapunov theory is that V˙ (z)< 0 or V˙ (x)< 0, along the trajectories of the system, than V (x)
will ↓, t→∞ (Hokayem, Mastellone et al. 2006). If for instance one considers nonlinear system in the following
form:
x˙ = f (x) =
[
f1(x)
f2(x)
]
=
[−x1+3x21x2
−x2
]
(7)
And the candidate Lyapunov function given as: V (x) = λ1x21+λ2x22. And λ1,λ2 > 0. And V (x)→∞ as ||x||→∞.
The derivative of V along the trajectories is given as:
V˙ = 2λ1x1(−x1+3x21x2)+2λ2x2(−x2) =−2λ1x21−2λ2x22+6λ1x21x2 (8)
Henceforth, if V˙ (x) < 0, V ↓ along the solution of x˙ = f (x). Local minimum of a convex function is given as
some point x∗ such that: ∃ε > 0, and f (x)∗ < f (x),∀x, all the feasible x (Mishra, Wang et al. 2008).
4 The second fundamental welfare theorem and nonconvexities
Second fundamental theorem is giving conditions under which a Pareto optimal allocation can be supported
as a price equilibrium with lump-sum transfers, i.e. Pareto optimal allocation as a market equilibrium can be
achieved by using appropriate scheme of wealth distribution (wealth transfers) scheme (Mas-Colell, Whinston
et al. 1995).Assumption of convexity (in technology, preferences), is crucial for the establishment of the second
welfare theorem. Second fundamental welfare theorem can be specified as follows: Given an economy such as;
({Xi,i}Ii=1,{Yj,}Jj=1, ω¯) i, allocation is given with (x∗,y∗), and a price vector p 6= 0, (here p= p1, . . . , pn ), and
i We assume that ∑iω  0 (level of income or wealth is much larger than zero)
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this combination constitutes price quasi-equilibrium with transfers (ω1, . . . ,ωI), subject to the following budget
constraint: ∑iωi = pω¯+∑i py∗j , where ∀ j,y∗j ,max j py∗j , pyi ≤ py∗j ,∀y j ∈ Yj. And ∀i,∃xi i x∗i → pxi ≥ ωi. And
∑i x∗i = ω +∑ j y∗j . Under the assumption of locally non-satiated preferences ( on X j is locally nonsatiated if
∀x ∈ X ,ε > 0,∃y ∈ X , ||y− x|| < ε , u(y) > u(x)), we have following equality pxi = ωi. This theorem holds if
preferences are convex i.e.: The set A⊂ Rn is convex compact and nonempty set if λx+(1−λ )x′ ∈ A,x,x′ ∈ A
and λ ∈ [0,1]. There is a theorem that gives sufficient conditions for the existence of hyperplane separating sets,
that is the Separating hyperplane theoremk. A hyperplane is the set:
H(p,α) = {x ∈ Rn|pH0 = α} (9)
Hyperplane in Rn can be described by an equation ∑ni=1 pixi = α , here vector p ∈ Rn is a non-zero price
vector, and α is scalar (Simon and Blume 1994, Yu and Phillips 2018). The vector p is then said to be
normal to the hyperplane H. If one defines two points (x∗,y∗) ∈ H(p,α), and by defining, p · x∗ = α and,
p · y∗ = α , in other words vector p is orthogonal to the line segment (x ∗−y∗) i.e. p · (x ∗−y∗) = 0. By
picking arbitrary points previous result can be generalized to all points i.e. line segments in (p,α), or that p
is orthogonal to H(p,α). Open half-spaces in the hyperplane are defined by inequalities: {x ∈ Rn|pH0 ≤ α}
or {x ∈ Rn|pH0 ≥ α}. First expression, from previous two is example of budget set. If the preferences are
assumed convex then every ui is concave and under this hypothesis every set Ui is concave. First, a vector
x = (x1, . . . ,xn) ∈ Rn is an allocation if ∑i xi ≤ ω , (Mas-Colell 1989).In previous expression ω ∈ Rn+ is a total
endowment of commodities, and production is allowed. Utility function is given as; U = {u ∈ Rn : u ≤ u(x)}.
Previous function can be generalized that if preferences are nonconvex i.e. they are concave and their function
is concave i.e. f : A→ R is nonconvex, in other expression this is translated to:{(x,y) ∈ Rn+1 : y≤ f (x),x ∈ A},
and the last set is convex. Let is suppose that x ∈ B is an extreme point of the convex set ⊂ Rn, this means
that x 6= λx+(1−λ )x′ ,x,x′ ∈ A and λ ∈ [0,1]. Separating hyperplane theorem can be stated as follows: Let
is suppose that B ⊂ Rn is a convex and closed set and x /∈ B,∃p ∈ Rn, p 6= 0,α ∈ R, p · x > α, p · y < α,∀y ∈ B.
Convex sets A,B ⊂ Rn are disjoint A∩B = /0,∃p ∈ Rn, p 6= 0, p · x > α, p · y < α,∀y ∈ B.Then there is a hyper-
plane that separates A and B, leaving them on different sides of it. In support of this theorem if B⊂ Rn is convex
and x /∈ intB,∃p ∈ Rn, p · x ≥ p · y, p 6= 0. If A and B are convex, A−B /∈ 0,A∩B = /0. Let is say that S ∈ Rm if
z∗ is a boundary point of set S,∃p 6= 0,z ∈ S→ p · z≤ p · z∗, proof of this will come from a simple lemma: if S
is a closed and convex set l, x ∈ S, and if b is the boundary of this set, then there exists scalar α 6= 0 such that:
x∈ S→αx≤αb. Previous theorem (S,∃p 6= 0,z∈ S→ p ·z≤ p ·z∗, where p is an m− dimensional price vector)
holds if m = 1, this theorem is also true when m = n+1 (Fibich and Gavish 2011). Here n+1 is the dimension
of S production set. Now z is n+ 1 dimensional vector, x is n dimensional vector and y is one dimensional
scalar: z = (y,x),n -dimensional set is: X(y)≡ {x|(y,x) ∈ S}. Now, from these two convex sets S,X(y) follows
that: (λy+(1−λ )y′ ,λx+(1−λ )x′) ∈ S, and x ∈ X(y∗)→ pxx ≥ pxx∗. Now for one dimensional space we
use following lemma to proof separating hyperplane theorem: f (y)− f (a)≥ f ′(a)(y−a),∀y ∈ A. If we want to
minimize some function let say cost function then we have: cp,x(y) =minx∈X(y)>x ·x, or cp,x(y) = pxx∗. And be-
cause cost function is a minimal function cp,x(λy+(1−λ )y′)≤ px(λ xˆ+(1−λ )xˆ′) = λcp,x(y)−(1−λ )cp,x(y).
From, previous, it follows that cp,x(y)−cp,x(y∗)≥ py(y−y∗), and since by definition (y,x)∈ S⇒ cp,x(y)≤ px ·x.
From previous, (y,x) ∈ S⇒ px · x− px · x∗ ≥ py(y− y∗). And, n+ 1 dimensional vector space is given by:
p≡ py− px, since px 6= 0→ p 6= 0. These last expressions are the same as: z ∈ S→ p · z≤ p · z∗. These results
can also be proved with a Hahn-Bannach separated hyperplane theorem. Convex sets A,B ⊂ Xn are disjoint
∩B = ∞, in a topological vector space X . And presumptions are: If A is open ∃Λ ∈ X∗ (linear map) and λ ∈ R
j Preference relation  is a relation ⊂ Rl+×Rl+. With properties x  x,∀x ∈ Rl+ (reflexivity), x  y,y  z⇒ x  z (transitivity), is
a closed set (continuity), ∀(x  y),∃(y  x) (completeness), given ,∀(x 0) the at least good set {y : y  x} is closed relative to Rl
(boundary condition), A is convex, if {y : y x} is convex set for every y,ay+(1−λ )x x, whenever y x and 0 < a < 1, Mas-Colell,
A. (1986).
k In geometry hyperplane of an n dimensional vector space V is a subspace of a n−1 dimension, or equivalently of codimension 1 in V
l Its complement is an open set. Closed set is defined as a set that contains all of its limit points.
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such that: the real part of the complex number is given as ReΛx≤ λ ≤ ReΛy,∀x ∈ A,∀y ∈ B. If A is compact m,
B is closed, and λ is locally convex, ∃Λ ∈ X∗,λ1 ∈ R,λ2 ∈ R, and ReΛx < λ1 < λ2 < ReΛy,∀x ∈ A,∀y ∈ B.In
real numbers set only ReΛ= Λ. Real scalars are assumed A0 ∈ A,b0 ∈ B, and convex neighborhood is given as:
C = A−B+ x0,since A∩B = ∞,x0 /∈C, and Minkowski functional is given as: p(x0) ≥ 1. In particular Λ ≤ 1
on CΛ ≤ 1 on −C. Now, this means that |Λ| ≤ 1,on the neighborhood C∩ (−C) of 0, and Λ ∈ X∗. Now if
α ∈ A,b ∈ B,will give : Λa−Λb+1 = Λ(a−b+ x0) ≤ p(a−b+ x0) < 1.Now, since Λx0 = 1,a−b+ x0 ∈C,
and C is open, Λa 6= Λb,Λa < Λb,SoΛ(A),Λ(B) are closed disjoint sets (Rudin 2006). There is one supporting
property more, following Mas-Colell, it states that :for ∀p 6= 0, the subspace Tp = {v ∈ Rn : p · v = 0}, and this
subspace is called hyperplane perpendicular to p (Mas-Colell 1989). The convex set is {v ∈ Rn : p · v≤ 0}, and
it is a half space below Tp. Convex set is, where x ∈ A, i f A−{x} ⊆ xn > 0(≥ 0). And, one can write that:
{p ·y : y ∈ A} ≤ p ·x, i.e. p ·A≤ p ·x, if p ·y≤ p ·x,∀y ∈ A,y 6= x, one can say that p supports strictly. Therefore,
supporting hyperplane theorem:
Theorem 3. Supporting hyperplane theorem: If A ⊂ Rn is convex and x ∈ ∂A, the A is supported at x by some
p 6= 0. If A is closed, and x = 0, then the support can be strict.
Now, for a concave function f : (a,b)→ R is continuous in IntA. This function f : (a,b)→ R is concave in
the interval (a,b), if for every x1,x2 ∈ (a,b),a ∈ (0,1), it follows f (ax1+(1−a)x2)< a f (x1)+(1−a) f (x2).If
the function is continuous and twice differentiable i.e. C2 on the open interval (a,b), then this function is concave
on (a,b) if: ∀x ∈ (a,b), f ′′(x)< 0. Or a C2 function: g : A→ Rn on the open and convex set A⊂ Rn is concave
if and only if ∂ 2 f (x)< 0 and is semidefinite for all x,then f is strictly concave. In the literature of this king very
important term is marginal cost pricing equilibrium which is a family of consumption, production plans, lump
sum taxes and prices such that such that households are maiming their utility subject to their budget constraints
and firms production plans that satisfy the FONCs (First order necessary conditions), for smooth optimization
and for functions as: f : Rl → Rn and h : Rl → Rm are C1, constraint set is given as : E = {x ∈ Rl : h(x) ≥ 0}
(Brown 1991).
Some x ∈ E is a local weak maximum of f subject to h. Now FONCs are:
1. If x is a local weak maximum of f subject to h, then there are(λ ,µ) ∈ Rn+×Rm+ so that:
(a) (λ ,µ) 6= 0
(b) h j(x)< 0,µ j = 0
(c) ∑ni=1λi∂ fi(x)+∑
m
j=1 µ j∂h j(x) = 0 (Mas-Colell 1989)
2. SONCs (second order necessary conditions) state that if f and h are C2, and x∈E satisfies the FONCs with
respect to (λ ,µ)∈Rn+×Rm+, than we will consider the bilinear form: B=∑ni=1λi∂ 2 fi(x)+∑mj=1 µ j∂ 2h j(x),
and the cone is presented by; K = {v ∈ Rl : ∂ fi(x) ≥ 0,λi∂ fi(x) · v = 0,∀i,∂h j(x) · v ≥ 0,µ j∂h j(x) · v =
0,∀ j,and h j(x) = 0}. Now if x is local maximum, λ > 0 and rank {∂ fi(x),∂h j(x) : i≤ n, j ≤ m,h j(x) =
0} = n+{ j : h j(x) = 0}−1, then B is negative and semidefinite. If B is negative and semidefinite on K
then x is local maximum.
For the MCP equilibrium it is important to note that if all firms have convex technologies with zero vector, then
MCP equilibrium becomes Walrasian equilibrium. Now from previous, if f is strictly non-convex (concave),
and the feasible set A is convex, then the maximizer x∗ is unique. In the proof of this let is suppose that
there exist two maximizers, x and x′, then we have λx+(1− λ )x′ ∈ A, by the strict definition for concavity
0 < λ < 1. Now, f (λx+ (1− λ )x′) > λ f (x) + (1− λ ) f (x′) = f (x) = f (x′). As an example let is take
one consumer problem let say: maxx1,x2x
1/2
1 x
1/2
2 , subject to: x1 + x2 ≤ 1,x1 ≥ 0,x2 ≥ 0. So the feasible set
m A subset of Euclidean space in particular is called compact if it is closed and bounded. This implies, by the Bolzano=seierstrass
theorem, that any infinite sequence from the set has a subsequence that converges to a point in the set.
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A = {x1 + x2 ≤ 1,x1 ≥ 0,x2 ≥ 0}, and this is compact set n, and the function x1/21 x1/22 is continuous, so by
the Bolzano - Weierstrass theorem, that states that any infinite sequence from the set, every infinite subset
of S has a limit point (this not necessary lies in the subset) (Green and Heller 1981). In general case for a
given bifunction B : H ×H → R, one considers finding a solution u ∈ K, where K is a closed and convex
set, and: B(u,v− u) ≥ 0,∀v ∈ K, this is called bifunction variation inequality (Noor, Noor et al. 2012). In,
previous expressions H is a Hilbert space. Now if there are two given bifunctions with their inner products
F(·, ·),B(·, ·) : H×H→ R. The problem of finding u ∈ K is called nonconvex bifunction equilibrium variational
inequality: F(u,v)+B(u,v−u)+ϕ||v−u||2 ≥ 0,∀v ∈ K. Proposed iterative method, here is convergence that
requires partially relaxed strongly monotonicity. A monotonic function is a function which is either entirely
nonincreasing or nondecreasing. A function is monotonic if its first derivative (which need not be continuous)
does not change sign. If a function f : X → Y is a set function from a collection of sets X to an ordered set
Y, then f is monotone whenever A ⊆ B as elements of X , f (A) ≤ f (B) (Royden and Fitzpatrick 2017). The
proposed bifunction can be monotone Type (I) and Type II. Type (I) monotonicity of proposed bifunction is
given by the : T (·, ·) : H×H→ R this bifunctions is said to be monotone Type (I) with respect to the operator g
if and only if T (u,g(v)−g(u))+T (v,g(u)−g(v))≥ 0,∀u,v ∈H.And a bifunction :F : H×H→ R is said to be
monotone of type (II) with respect to the operator g if and only if : F(g(u),g(v))+F(g(v),g(u))≤ 0,∀u,v ∈ H
(Noor, Noor et al. 2012). The sum of large number of non-convex sets is convex (approximately) (Starr 2011,
Starr 2016). A typical non-convex set contains a hole for indentation. Having this in mind one can write
Shapley-Folkman lemma:
Lemma 4. Shapley-Folkman lemma: Let S1,S2,S3, . . .Sm⊆∪S(x,yi)EDnC o, and these are nonempty compact sets.
And, x = con(S1,S2,S3, . . .Sm),∀i = 1,2, . . . ,m,∃yi = con(Si),∑mi=1 yi = x,yi ∈ Si. With utmost n exceptions.
From here follows Shapley -Folkman theorem in general terms:
Theorem 5. Shapley-Folkman theorem: rad(S)≡ in fx∈Rn>upy∈S>x− y|,S⊂ Rn,rad(S)≤ L,∀S ∈C,rad(S) is
the radius of the smallest ball (set) containing S. And F is a family of compact subsets S⊂ Rn, and L > 0p, and
rad(S)≤ L,∀S ∈ F. And, ∀x ∈ con(∑S∈F S),∃y ∈ con(∑S∈F S),→ |x− y| ≤ L
√
N.
Theorem 6. Caratheodory theorem: x ∈ con(Ai, . . . ,Am),Ai ⊂ RL,∃(ai,am+1),ai ∈ A,x ∈ con(Ai, . . . ,Am+1).
Theorem 7. Shapley-Folkman theorem: x∈ con(Ai, . . . ,Am),Ai⊂RL,∃(x= ai+ · · ·+am),ai ∈ conAi,∀i,∀ai ∈Ai
for m− i, (Anderson, Khan et al. 1982)
Lemma 8. x ∈ con(Ai, . . . ,Am),Ai ⊂ RL :
x =
m
∑
i=1
m j
∑
j=0
λi jai j,λi j > 0,
m
∑
i=1
mi ≤ L,
m j
∑
j=0
λi j = 1,∀i (10)
Proof. Proof of Caratheodory theorem : = 1,x = ∑m1j=1λ1 ja1 j,m1−1≤ L,x = x = ∑mj=1λ ja j,m≤ L+1
Proof. Proof of the Shapley-Folkman theorem: ∑mi=1(mi− 1) ≤ L,m = 1,@(m = 1) for ∀L values of i. Now,
ai = ∑
m j
j=1λi jai j ∈ conAi,ai = ∑1j=1λi jai j = ai1.
About the existence of equilibrium in this economy, one can use strict preference relations to prove the
existence of such:
1. Commodity space will be given as: RL+
n Euclidan space that is closed and bounded (all points lie within some fixed distance between each other).
o Here C is an arbitrary collection of sets.
p Here L is the upper bound for a circle equals 2piradd = pid, where d is the diameter. For general shapes, it can be calculate as
´ L
0 ds.
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2. The set of preferences is given as: ∑mi=1 i,i and those preferences satisfy:
(a) continuity: {(x,y) ∈ RL+×RL+ : xi y}
(b) transitivity: x y,y z,x z
(c) Irreflexivity : :x≯ y,
(d) Weak monotonicity:x y,xi
If x is in the core of the Edgeworth box,see (Barreto 2009). (exchange economy),∃p ∈4 :
1
m
m
∑
i=1
|p · (xi−ωi)| ≤ 2Lm {max||ω1||∞, . . . , ||ωm||∞} (11)
1
m
m
∑
i=1
|in f{p · (y− xi) : yi xi}| ≤ 4Lm {max||ω1||∞, . . . , ||ωm||∞} (12)
In previous expression ||ω||∞ denotes ∑mi=1 |ω i| q, or ||ω||∞ = maxi>xi| (Anderson 1981). Now if:
p · (xi−ωi) = 0⇒ xi ∈ B(p), yi xi⇒ p · y≥ p ·ωi (13)
This is Walrasian quasiequilibrum: since agents i consumption need not lie in its budget set B(p), and can be far
below the budget frontier. In previous expressions
ϕ(p,x,) = |in f>p · (y− xi) : yi xi}| (14)
Here ϕ(p,x,) represents a measure that measures how far x is from the demand like (Anderson 1988). If
p  0, then ϕ(p,x,) = 0,∃x ∈ D(p,( x)). In the context fo the second welfare theorem a Walrasian
quasiequilibrium for an endowment ω , with an income transfer τ is given as: ∑a∈A f (a) ≤ ∑a∈Aω(a), p ∈ 4,
and f (a) ∈ Q(p,a,τ), where Q(p,a,τ) is a Walrasian quasiequilibria and Q(p,a,τ) = Q(ω,τ). A social -
approximate compensated equilibrium(as approximation to market equilibrium) with non-convex preferences
consists among other things of modulus A:
|(x1− y1)− (x2− y2)| ≤ A (15)
Also, price vector p∗ > 0, and two allocations ω1 = (x1,y1) and ω2 = (x2,y2) (Arrow and Hahn 1971). Now
furthermore:
|x− y|2 ≤ ∑
S∈F ′
[rad(S)]2 ≤ L2 = mL2 ≤ nL2 (16)
Here F ′ is a subfamily of sets of F , m is the number of members of ’ , n is the number of commodities or the
dimension of space F,L is some number. So:
F
′ ⊂ F,x ∈ con ∑
S∈F ′
S,y ∈ ∑
S∈F ′
S, |x− y| ≤ L√n (17)
In the previous expression L is some number. The proof of Shapley-Folkman theorem has a lot with Gale-
Debreu-Nikaido lemma:
Lemma 9. Gale-Debreu-Nikaido lemma:Z :4→ 2Rn , in previous expression 4 is the Laplace operator given
by the divergence of gradient(derivative) of a function in a Euclidean space r. Where Z is nonempty, compact,
and convex, p∈4,∃z∈ Z(p), where Z(p) is an excess demand function, so that p ·z≤ 0. And, ∃p∗ ∈4,Z(p∗)∩
Rn− 6= /0, (Yannelis 1991, Aliprantis, Tourky et al. 2000, Podczeck and Yannelis 2008).
q Actually ∑mi=1 |ω i|= ∑i∈S x,i, where x,i = ωi + zi + zS
r In Cartesian system Laplace operator is given as the sum of second order partial derivatives of the function with respect to each
independent variable.
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By the separating hyperplane theorem for ∃p∗ ∈ 4,Z(p∗)∩Rn− 6= /0, then ∃q∗ ∈ Rn \ 0,upsy ∈ Rn−q ∗ ·y ≤
n f sz ∈ Z(p)q∗ ·z. Furthermore ∈ 4,q1 · z > 0,q2 · z > 0,∀λ ∈ [0,1],λq1 +(1−λ )q2 · z > 0,q∗ ∈ F(p), where
F(p),q ∈ 4 inverse for F−1(q) = {p ∈ 4 : Z(p) ⊂ {z : q · z > 0}}. And, p∗ = f (p) ∈ F(p), p ∗ ·z > 0,∃∀z ∈
Z(p∗), which contradicts Walras law above. Many problems in economics such as existence of competitive
equilibrium in general equilibrium theory, can be formulated as fixed-point theorems (Border 1989, Farmakis,
Moskowitz et al. 2013). Brouwer theorem states that every continuous function on X has fixed point. The basic
Brouwer theorem was set by Brouwer, L. E. J. (Brouwer 1912). Let f be a function mapping o f a compact set
K in itself. A fixed point of f is a point z ∈ K, satisfying f (z) = z, (Border 1989, Shashkin 1991).
FPA asymmetric N-bidder auctions
There is a set of Θ = {1,2, . . . ,N}, of types of bidders. And ∀Θ ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N} and ∃n(Θ) ≥ 1, which are
bidders of type Θ. Bidders of type Θ draw an IPV for the object from CDF F : [ωH ,ωL]→ R. It is assumed that
F ∈C2((ωH ,ωL)) and f ≡ F ′ > 0, on ωH . The inverse of equilibrium bidding strategy (such as in Maskin and
Riley (Maskin and Riley 2000) and Fibich and Gavish (Fibich and Gavish 2011)) is given as :
v′i(b) =
Fi(vi(b))
fi(vi(b)
= [(
1
(n−1)
n
∑
j=1
1
v j(b)−b) −
1
vi(b)−b ], i = 1, . . . ,n (18)
The initial conditions is given as: vi(0) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,n, the value for the maximum bid is set to: vi{b¯}= 1, i =
1, . . . ,n. In the asymmetric case vi(b) 6= v(b),v j(b) 6= v(b). In the symmetric case the previous expression would
reduce to:
b(vi) = v− 1Fn−1(v)
ˆ v
r
n−1(s)xs (19)
Also ˆ v
r
n−1(s)xs =
ˆ v
r
sn−1ds (20)
in general case nonuniform distribution of FPA auction is given as :
β (v) = x−
ˆ v
0
F(y)
F(x)
dy (21)
Where F(y) = 1−F(x),(F(x) is a CDF of a function), x signals are drawn from private values distribution v so
xi = vi. The maximal bid of FPA distributions is then given as
b¯ = b(1) = 1−
ˆ 1
0
n−1(s)ds (22)
The inverse bid functions are solutions of (as in Fibich and Gavious (Fibich and Gavious 2003)):
∂ ∪i (b;vi)
∂b
= (vi−b)
n
∑
j=1, j 6=1
(
n
∏
k=1,k 6=1
Fk(vk(b)))z j(v j(b))v
′
j(b)−
n
∏
j=1, j 6=1
j(v j(b)) = 0 (23)
vi is given fixed, and the maximization problem is:
maxb∪i (b;vi) = (vi−b)
n
∏
j=1, j 6=1
Fj(v j(b)), i = 1, . . .n (24)
n
∑
j=1, j 6=1
f j(v j(b)v
′
j(b)
Fj(v j(b))
− 1
vi(b)−b , i = 1, . . .n (25)
Or bidder chooses to maximize his expected surplus pii as in McAfee and McMillan (McAfee and McMillan
1987):
pii = (vi−bi)F(β−1(b1))n−1 (26)
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And ∂pii∂bi = 0,
dy
dx =
∂pii
∂vi = F(β
−1(b1))n−1. Another study by Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel, and Wolfstetter (Gwth,
Ivanova-Stenzel et al. 2005), uses bid functions for asymmetric bidders proposed by Plum (Plum 1992):
b fi (vi) = ωl +
vi−ωl√
1+ γic(vi−ωl)2
,∀i = 1, ..,n (27)
c :=
1
(b1−ωl)2 −
1
(b2−ωl)2 (28)
Where γi ∈ [−1,1], is the PDF, ωl is the lower boundary of the statistical distribution (chosen to describe the
bidders=òehavior). In practice bidders valuation are drawn from different statistical distributions, as in Vick-
rey type auction (Vickrey 1961). In the Vickrey type of auction s, bidders submit their bids without knowing
the other bidders valuations(Vickrey 1961). Vickrey found that in the case where one valuation is commonly
known, buyers 1 inverse bid function is given as (Kaplan and Zamir 2012) :
v1(b) =
β 2
4(β −b) (29)
This is the case where one valuation is commonly known and where there are two bidders with uniform distri-
butions. Or when ωl = ωh = β . If there are 2 bidders only and their values are uniformly and independently
distributed on (0,1) and (0,ωh),ωh < 1, as in Milgrom (Milgrom 2004):
ˆ ωh
0
x · x
ωh
dx+
ˆ 1
ωh
xdx+
ˆ ωh
0
y2dy =
ω2h
3
+(
1
2
− ω
2
h
2
)+
ω3h
3
=
1
2
+
1
6
ω2h +
1
3
ω3h (30)
And E(v1,2) = 12(1−ωh). In general case as in Plum (Plum 1992), for the probability densities ϕi(x) = ci(x−
ωl)µ ,ωl < x < βi, i = 1,2 . . .n, there exists and equilibrium solutions:
f1(x) = ωl +
1− [1− c(vi−ωl)k]1− 1k
c(vi−ωl)k−1 ,ωl < x≤ β1 (31)
f2(x) = ωl +
1− [1− c(vi−ωl)k]1− 1k
c(vi−ωl)k−1 ,ωl < x≤ β2 (32)
Where c := 1
(b1−ωl)k −
1
(b2−ωl)k ; or ci :=
µ+1
βi−ωl)µ+1 , where µ > −1, and k := ((2− λ + µ))/(1− λ ),λ ∈ [0,1].
There are ki - bidders in group i, in total N = ∑ni=1 ki. Bidders submit bids that are solutions to the optimization
problem, which is as in Gayle and Richard (Gayle and Richard 2008):
β (v) = argmaxu∈(0,ωh)(v−u) · [Fi(λi(u))]ki−1∏
j 6=1
[Fj(λ j(u))]k j (33)
∃u = ∑ni=1 ui, where ui denotes the player of type i. Truncated CDF in general form is given as:
F∗(v) =
n
∏
j=1
Fj(v)−Fj(ωl)
Fj(ωh)−Fj(ωl) (34)
Probabilities of winning the auction are given by the following expression:
pi(r) = ki
ˆ b(ωh)
r
l
′
i(v)
li(v)
n
∏
j=1
[l j(v)]k j dv (35)
s In Vickrey type of auction each bidder bids its own valuation, and this is optimal strategy. This is a sealed bid auction where the highest
bid wins, but pays only the second highest bid.
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Where li(v) = Fi(λi(v)). Also, r represents the reserve price in auction. Expected revenue for the auctioneer is
given by:
E(p,bi,vi) = ωh− r
n
∏
j=1
[Fj(r)]k j −
ˆ b(ωh)
r
l
′
i(v)
li(v)
n
∏
j=1
[l j(v)]k j dv (36)
Group i bidders expected revenue is given by:
Ei(p,bi,vi) = ki
ˆ b(ωh)
r
[F−1i li(v))− v] ·
l
′
i(v)
(li(v)
n
∏
j=1
[l j(v)]k j dv (37)
Now if U(pi,Ei,r) = pi ·(r−Ei), by the envelope theorem optimal values are denoted by asterisk ∗r′(r) = p∗(r),
as in Milgrom (Milgrom 1989), and one can integrate to obtain the previous result.
U∗(x) =
ˆ r
0
p∗(v)dv (38)
Previous proof confirms the Revenue equivalence theorem. Revenue equivalence theorem confirms that if there
are n risk neutral agents, that do independent and personal evaluation of some auction good, and valuation
follows cumulative distribution F(v), which is ascending probability distribution of a continuous set of choices
(v,v). Than every auction mechanism (every institution auction), in which lot will be allocated towards the
agent for which it has highest value v, and every agent with a valuation of good v has utility 0, generates exact
same revenue, which lead every bidder to make the same payment. FPA sealed-bid, SPA sealed-bid auctions
generate the same price on average. This result is confirmed in: Vickrey (Vickrey 1961), Ortega-Reichert
(Ortega-Reichert 1967), Myerson (Myerson 1981), Riley and Samuelson (Riley and Samuelson 1981), etc. At
BNE each player tries to maximize its own expected payoff E(vi−b)||(β−i < bi)|v1, as in Campo, Perrigne and
Vuong (Campo, Perrigne et al. 2003). Now, β−i = max{v1(y∗1i),v0(y∗0i)},y∗1i = max j 6=i, j∈G1vi=1, j, where G1 is a
cartel of better informed bidders and y∗0i =max j 6=i, j∈G0vi=0, j,G0 are weak i.e. less informed bidders. And v1 and
v0 are the equilibrium bids of the bidder types 1 and 0 respectively. Maximization problem for any bidder can
be written as:
maxb1i = (v1i−b1i)Prob(y∗1i ≤ v−11 (b1i))∧ y0i ≤ v−10 (b1i)|v1i (39)
Probability can be written as: Fy∗1,y0|v1(v
−1
1 (b1i)),v
−1
0 (b1i)|v1i. FONC for v1i bidder is given as:
−Fy∗1,y0|v1(v−11 (b1i)),v−10 (b1i)|v1i+
(v1i−b1i)[
(∂Fy∗1,y0|v1(v
−1
1 (b1i)),v
−1
0 (b1i)|v1i
∂y∗1i
· 1
v′1(v
−1
1 (b1i))
+
(∂Fy∗1,y0|v1(v
−1
1 (b1i)),v
−1
0 (b1i)|v1i
∂y0
· 1
(v′0(v
−1
0 (b1i))
] (40)
In the previous expression v1i ∈ [ωl,ωh], and b1i = v1(v1i). FONC for v0i bidder can be obtained in the similar
manner. A market action should be attainable by actions of a consumer or a collation of consumers. This leads us
to the concept of core economy Ce. Every allocation in the core of the economy is said to be Pareto efficient, i.e.
the allocation cannot be changed such that one agent is strictly better off without making any other agent worse
off. And furthermore, the set of all competitive equilibrium allocations Cε is contained in the core, Cε ⊂Ce (Jain
2004). The question that arises here is whether core of the economy is equivalent to the competitive equilibrium
allocations. Shapley and Shubik studied one asymmetric economy in the indivisible goods markets (houses)
but with only one or two buyers (Shapley and Shubik 1971). These are non-combinatorial market cases. One
example of combinatorial market is given in Bikhchandani and Mamer (Bikhchandani and Mamer 1997). Early
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attempt to explain indivisible goods market by "matching models" (college admissions and university quotas)
and "stable marriage" assignment problem were analyzed. These papers proved that indivisible goods market
economy has non-empty core. Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz lemma is a basic result in fixed point theory.
Or Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz-Shapley theorem which is a generalization of previous lemma, based on
Brower fixed point theorem. Theorem K-K-M-S is stated as follows: Cs : S ⊂ N is a family of closed subsets
of simplex ∆N . Where ∆N = {x ∈ Rn : xi > 0,∧∑ni=1 xi = 1}, is a n− 1 simple, for S ⊂ N,∆S = {x ∈ ∆n : xi >
0,∧∑i∈S xi = 1}. Now, we can assume that ∆T ⊂∪S⊂T s,∀T ⊂ N,∃B,∩s∈BCs 6= /0. Where, B is a balanced family
(collection), such that intersection of sets indexed by B is nonempty (Krasa and Yannelis 1994) t.And "the
core approaches the set of equilibrium allocations as the number of traders tends to infinity", and a continuum
economy is an appropriate mathematical model of a situation of existence of "many" commodities (Aumann
1964).
Literature review on previous research concerning numerical solutions on asymmetric auctions
The first researchers to propose using numerical algorithms to solve for the equilibrium or inverse bid functions
were Marshall, Meurer, Richard and Stromquist (Marshall, Meurer et al. 1994). They applied l’Hopital’s rule to
the FOC to derive: lims→0+ → ϕ ′k(b) = (nk+1)nk . Where ϕ
′
k(b) is a first derivative of the inverse bid function, and
nk are the number of bidders in coalition. Inverse bid functions are in practice normalized to δk(b) =
ϕk(b)
b . They
approximated {δk(b)}2k = 1 by Taylor series expansions of order 5 around each point bt ∈ [ωL,ωH ]. Condition
for valid solution is: 12 ∑
2
k=1[δk(ωL)− (nk+1)nk ] ≤ ε2, where ε is some tolerance level (convergence criterion), of
order 10−5− 10−8. Bajari (2001) proposed that inverse bid function (n-bidders) can be represented as a linear
combination of ordinary polynomials (Bajari 2001). This can be presented in the following manner:
ω̂n(b) = b−
K
∑
k=0
αn,k (b−b)k,n = 1,2, . . . ,N (41)
FOC for bidder n can be expressed as:
1 = [ϕn(b)−b] ∑
m6=n
fm[ϕm(b)]
Fm[ϕm(b)]
ϕ ′m(b) (42)
and
Gn(ωL,ωH ,α) = 1− [ϕn(b)−b] ∑
m6=n
fm[ϕm(b)]
Fm[ϕm(b)]
ϕm(b) (43)
And the left boundary condition is: ϕn(ωL) = ωL, and the right boundary condition is ϕn(ωH) = ωH . In Fib-
bich and Gavious (Fibich and Gavious 2003), is suggested using a perturbation analysis to calculate an explicit
approximation to the asymmetric FPA solution, they defined average distribution between N bidders at a val-
uation v, namely : Faverage ≡ 1N ∑Nn=1 Fn(v). The parameter that measures the level of asymmetry is given as:
ε =maxn∈{1,...,N}>axv∈{ωL,ωH}>Fn(v)−Faverage(v)|, and that Fn(v) =Faverage(v)+εAn(v),n= 1, ..N, where aux-
iliary function An(v) =
Fn(v)−Faverage(v)
ε . Equilibrium bid function
u, when bidders draw valuations from Faverage(·)
is given (Schmedders and Judd 2013):
En[v,An(v)] =
1−N
FN−1average(v)
·
t In the proof of this theorem provided in this paper Krasa and Yannelis (1994) it is defined set valued function: ψ = ∆N → 2Rn ,F(x) =
con999, where mS = {mS1, . . . ,mSN} is the center of the simplex ∆S.And mSi = 1|S| , i ∈ S,mSi = 0, i /∈ S.And ψ(x) = {y : f (x)x >
f (x)y},∃T ⊂ N, and int∆n = {x = (x0, . . . ,xn) ∈ Rn+1|∑n0 xi = 1, xi > 0, ∀i}, therefore since S ⊂ T,S ∈ I(x∗) and mS ∈ F(x∗). And
the f (x∗)x∗ = f (x)mS > f (x∗)mN .
u Initial guess about maximum bid function is given as: b = ωH −
´ ωH
ωL F
N−1
average(v)dv
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· [
ˆ v
ωL
N−1
average(v)dvq
N
ˆ ωH
v
1
[FN−1average(v)]N−1
d[ An(t)(Faverage(t) ]
dt
dt (44)
Gayle and Richard (Gayle and Richard 2008), generalized backward shooting algorithm, they defined: ln(v) ≡
Fn[ϕn(v)], and now FOC can be defined as: 1= (F−1n [ln(v)]−v)∑m6=n l
′
n(v)
ln(v)
, and the high bid is chosen by solving:
minb[r,ωH ]
N
∑
n=1
[l(r|b−)−Fn(r)]2,r
is reserve price. Hubbard and Paarsch (Hubbard and Paarsch 2009) used Chebyshev polynomials, which are
orthogonal polynomials and more stable. Chebyshev nodes can be computed as: xt = cos[
pi(t−1)
T ], t = 1, . . . ,T.
The points {vt}Tt = 1 are found via transformation like this: vt = b+ωL+(b−ωL)xt2 . Chebyshev polynomials can be
defined recursively as T0(x) = 1,T1(x) = x,Tn+1(x) = 2xTn(x)+Tn−1(x). The coefficients of these polynomials
for a function f (x) can be obtained by the following integral:
an =
2
pi
ˆ 1
−1
f (x)Tn(x)
(1− x2)1/2 dx (45)
Hubbard, Kirkegaard and Paarsch imposed 5 in/equality constraints on the equilibrium bid functions v, that are
approximated by the Chebyshev polynomials of orderK (Hubbard, Kirkegaard et al. 2013). They approximated
the solution to differential equations (general FPA model):
ϕ
′
n(v) =
Fn[ϕ(v)]
fn[ϕ(v)]
([
1
N−1
N
∑
m=1
1
ϕn(v)− v ]−
1
ϕn(v)− v) (46)
And they are doing so by minimizing and solving:
minb,α
N
∑
n=1
T
∑
t=1
[Gn(ωL,ωH ,α)]2.
Where in previous minimization problem
Gn(ωL,ωH ,α) = 1− [ϕn(b)−b] ∑
m6=n
fm[ϕm(b)]
(Fm[ϕm(b)]
ϕ ′m(b).
Kirkegaard proved that if the CDFs cross each other (Fn(v) crosses Fm(v)), than their bid functions would cross
each other. Relative power of n bidder over m bidder and the utility of bidder n is measured as (Kirkegaard
2009):
Pn,m(v) =
Fm(v)
Fn(v)
,v ∈ (ωL,ωH)and Un(v) = (v−ωL)∏
m 6=n
Fm[ϕ(ωL)] (47)
And the ratio of n’s equilibrium pay-off relative to m’s equilibrium pay-off is: Rn,m(v) =
Un(v)
Um(v)
,v ∈ (ωL,ωH).
Kirkegaard assumes that comparing two ratios ∀v ∈ (ωL,ωH), is equivalent of comparing two bids bn(v) and
bm(v), i.e.: Rn,m(v) ≥ Pn,m(v)⇔ bn(v) ≥ bm(v). Right boundary condition is : Rn,m(ωH) = Pn,m(ωH) = 1, left
boundary condition is : limb→ωLRn,m(b) =
fm(ωL)
fn(ωL) = limb→ωLPn,m(b) (Kirkegaard 2009).
Asymmetric auctions: simulation results
In this part we choose 10 bidder types, there is only one bidder from each type, and these bidders draw their
v 1. ϕn(v) = ωL, 2.ϕn(b) = ωH 3.∑m6=n(b− v) fm(b)ϕ ′m(v) = 1, 4.ϕ(ωL) = N−1N , 5.ϕn(v j − 1) ≤ ϕn(v j), for some uniform array j =
2, . . . ,J.
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IPVs from for the object of the auction from their CDF F : [ωH ,ωL]→ R. Ten selected distributions in the
following order are, (see, (Johnson, Kemp et al. 2005)):
Table 1 Selected distributions and their CDFs and PDFs
Distributions 
and 
boundaries 
CDF PDF 
Beta[ ]0,1  
( ) ( )
( )
( ) 111 * 1 ;    
,
L
x
baF x x x dx
B a b
υ
ω
−−= −∫  
 ( ) L
H L
xx ωυ
ω ω
−
=
−
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1(1 )1
,
a b
H L
x x
f x
B a b
υ ν
ω ω
− −−
=
−
 
 
Exponential[ ]0,1   ( ) ( )( )
1 exp(
1 exp(
L
H L
x
F x
λ ω
λ ω ω
− − −
=
− − −
 
 
 ( ) ( )( )
exp(
1 exp(
L
H L
x
f x
λ λ ω
λ ω ω
− −
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− − −
 
 
Gamma[ ]0,1  
 ( ) ( )
1
0
Γ
k xx e dx
F x
k
∞ − −
= ∫  
 
 ( ) ( )
11
Γ
x
k
kf x x ek
θ
θ
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 Kumaraswamy
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( ) ( ) ( ) 11; , ' ; ; 1 ba af x a b F x a b abx x −−= = −  
Lognormal [ ]0,1  ( )
2
2
1 1
22
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22
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a
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∫
 
Standard normal 
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1 1
1
aF x x a c cαη
α
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
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Reverse power
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Java software has been applied for the simulations. The software name is Auction Solver and was written
by Richard M. Katzwer, see (Katzwer 2012). Next, in a table 2 are presented Chebyshev coefficients for 10
parametrized distributions with their CDFs and PDFs written in Table 1.
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Table 2 Solution: Chebyshev coefficients of K=15 degree
Beta 
distribution 
Exponential 
distribution 
Gamma 
distribution 
Kumaraswamy 
distribution 
Log nomal 
distribution 
Standard 
normal 
distribution 
Power l 
distribution 
Reverse 
power 
distribution 
Triangular 
distribution 
Uniform 
distribution 
0.0020 0.0031 0.0021 0.0020 0.0063 0.0032 0.0031 0.0011 0.0028 0.0033 
0.9845 0.9827 0.9813 0.9845 0.9886 0.9817 0.9807 0.9973 0.9823 0.9831 
0.0024 0.0035 0.0025 0.0024 0.0061 0.0036 0.0034 -0.0004 0.0028 0.0038 
0.0080 0.0104 0.0112 0.0080 0.0037 0.0103 0.0111 0.0144 0.0088 0.0100 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0000 
-0.0011 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0010 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0066 0.0010 -0.0009 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0018 0.0007 0.0009 -0.0048 0.0014 0.0004 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0004 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0025 -0.0006 0.0001 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0007 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0002 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
High bid: 0.893113927397631=b  
 
Table 2 Solution: Chebyshev coeff. of K=15 order reserve price =0.5
Beta 
distribution 
Exponential 
distribution 
Gamma 
distribution 
Kumaraswamy 
distribution 
Log nomal 
distribution 
Standard 
normal 
distribution 
Power l 
distribution 
Reverse power 
distribution 
Triangular 
distribution 
Uniform 
distribution 
0.4432 0.4224 0.4378 0.3424 0.2980 0.3970 0.4438 0.3830 0.4010 0.4123 
0.6213 0.6570 0.6284 0.7916 0.8710 0.7012 0.6191 0.7359 0.6901 0.6757 
-0.0764 -0.1015 -0.0877 -0.1854 -0.2211 -0.1301 -0.0803 -0.0853 -0.1231 -0.1121 
0.0190 -0.1015 0.0298 0.0611 0.0615 0.0447 0.0255 -0.0338 0.0369 0.0358 
0.0013 -0.0031 -0.0049 -0.0073 0.0029 -0.0064 -0.0032 0.0000 -0.0027 -0.0035 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
High bid: 0.9032115516025931=b  
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Table 3 Backward shooting method solution, end result: Convergence true
  b_bar A B B-A Result 
0/39 0.5 0 1 1.00E+00 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
1/39 0.75 0.5 1 5.00E-01 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
2/39 0.875 0.75 1 2.50E-01 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
3/39 0.8125 0.75 0.875 1.25E-01 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
4/39 0.78125 0.75 0.8125 6.25E-02 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
5/39 0.7968750 0.7812500 0.8125000 3.13E-02 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
6/39 0.8046875 0.7968750 0.8125000 1.56E-02 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
7/39 0.8085938 0.8046875 0.8125000 7.81E-03 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
8/39 0.8105469 0.8085938 0.8125000 3.91E-03 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
9/39 0.8095703 0.8085938 0.8105469 1.95E-03 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
10/39 0.8100586 0.8095703 0.8105469 9.77E-04 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
11/39 0.8103027 0.8100586 0.8105469 4.88E-04 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
12/39 0.8104248 0.8103027 0.8105469 2.44E-04 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
13/39 0.8103638 0.8103027 0.8104248 1.22E-04 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
14/39 0.8103333 0.8103027 0.8103638 6.10E-05 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
15/39 0.8103485 0.8103333 0.8103638 3.05E-05 1 Solution diverges to -infinity. 
16/39 0.8103409 0.8103333 0.8103485 1.53E-05 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
17/39 0.8103447 0.8103409 0.8103485 7.63E-06 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
18/39+ 0.8103428 0.8103409 0.8103447 3.82E-06 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
19/39 0.8103437 0.8103428 0.8103447 1.91E-06 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
20/39 0.8103433 0.8103428 0.8103437 9.54E-07 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
21/39 0.8103430 0.8103428 0.8103433 4.77E-07 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
22/39 0.8103431 0.8103430 0.8103433 2.38E-07 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
23/39 0.8103431 0.8103430 0.8103431 1.19E-07 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
24/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 5.96E-08 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
25/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 2.98E-08 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
26/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 1.49E-08 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
27/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 7.45E-09 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
28/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 3.73E-09 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
29/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 1.86E-09 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
30/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 9.31E-10 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
31/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 4.66E-10 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
32/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 2.33E-10 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
33/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 1.16E-10 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
34/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 5.82E-11 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
35/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 2.91E-11 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
36/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 1.46E-11 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
37/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 7.28E-12 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
38/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 3.64E-12 2 Solution diverges to +infinity. 
39/39 0.8103431 0.8103431 0.8103431 1.82E-12 3 Solution not within specified tolerances. 
Highest bid: 0.810343140133682=b . Shooting terminated at b = 0.5000231401337242. (b_underbar = 0.5) 
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Next in Table 4 are presented parameters for the Constrained strategic equilibrium and Backward shooting
solver.
Table 4 C.S.E. and Backward shooting parameters
Constrained strategic 
equilibrium (no reserve price) 
parameters 
Constrained strategic 
equilibrium (reserve price = 
0.5) parameters 
Backwards solver parameters 
T (degree) 40 T (degree) 40 Shooting method Euler 
K (grid) 15 K (grid) 15 ODE system Inverse bid 
functions 
lµ  2000 lµ  2000 
h1 (tolerance of the 
deviation of the solution 
from left boundary) 
1.0E-5 
hµ 5000 hµ 5000 
h2 (step size close to high 
bid) 
0.001 
FONCµ 5.0 FONCµ 5.0 Threshold 0.01 
bµ 0.0 bµ 0.0 High-bid precision 1.0E-12 
monoµ 1000 monoµ 1000 Left-boundary tolerance 1.0E-5 
Cheb grid = no Cheb Grid = no / / 
Euler method used in backward shooting solver is described as the simplest Runge-Kutta method, ODE is of the
form: dy(t)dt = f (t,y(t)),y(t0) = y0,
dy(t)
dt ≈ y(t+h)−y(t)h ,y(t +h)≈ y(t)+h dydt . The iterative solutions is than given
as: yn + 1 = yn + h f (tn,yn) or in previous expressions x ∈ (x0,xn). MATLAB also is a powerful tool used by
economists and can compute equilibrium strategies in a first-price auction with two players using the boundary
value method with fixed-point iterations, and by using the boundary value method with Newtons iterations.
A fixed point is a point that does not change upon of a function (map), system of differential equations etc.
(Shashkin 1991). In the Newton’s method the algorithm can be applied iteratively to obtain: xn+1 = xn− f (xn)f ′(xn−1) ,
if limxn+1→x∗
f (xn)
f ′(xn) = xn, and xn = x
∗+εn, where εn+1 = f
′′
(x∗)
2· f ′ (x∗)ε
2
n . Fixed point theorem states that if ∃ f (x)∈ [a,b],
then ∃x∈ [a,b], and f (x)−x= 0⇒ f (x) = x, see (Rosenlicht 1968). In our case Newton’s method has quadratic
convergence, i.e. we can denote residual (in two bidders case as, (see (Fibich and Gavious 2003, Fibich and
Gavish 2011)):
εb[b
′
,v1,b,v2] = b
′
(v2)− f2(v2)F2(v2)(v1−b) (48)
In a two bidders case one follows power law distributions, with CDF, F1 = c1v
a1
1 . And the second bidder distri-
bution is truncated normal with CDF: F2 = c2 · er f ( a f2a f2+1 ·
v√
2
), where the error return function is defined as:
er f (z) =
2√
pi
ˆ x
0
e−t
2
dt,
see (Abramowitz and Stegun 1964). Matlab code for this simple two bidder case was written by (Fibich and
Gavish 2011). In the next two graphs are presented two bidder’s distribution valuations.
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Fig. 1 Fixed point iterations result of the ratios of the two bidders’ valuations CDF/PDF functions
Fig. 2 Newtons iterations result of the two CDF/PDF bidders’ valuations functions
5 Conclusion
As it is known competitive equilibrium need not exist in the indivisible goods economy. These markets
include auctions where discrete items can be only traded, as a whole only. In combinatorial auction there is a
finite set of times but one buyer can only buy subset of items. All the previous research on the topic studied the
competitive equilibrium where there are only one or two buyers or sellers (Shapley and Shubik 1971, Khan and
Rath 2013). These markets are non-combinatorial since only one item (commodity) at time is a subject of sale.
The attempt to deal with non-convex preferences in finite setting by proposing approximate equilibria (Starr
1969, Starr 2011, Starr 2016).
This paper was written by following of this idea. In this paper asymmetric auction was used in order to prove
the previous theoretical models. Auction in most general terms is a game theoretic mechanism which allocates
an object (set of objects) and is composed of set of bidders χ , set of objects allocated , a private type space
Θ, and public type space Ξ. And where each bidder has type of distributions {θi,ξi} ∈ Θ×Ξ, and Θ×Ξ =
∑Ni=1Θi×∑Ni=1Ξi, which represents the space of all type profiles, see (Katzwer 2012). In the FPA auction that
was used for analysis in this paper every bidder pays its bid, the bidder does not know the opponents’ bids. In
the asymmetric type of FPA auctions highest bid wins, and highest winning bidder pays its bid. So, the highest
bid is considered to be the equilibrium bid.
In this type of market setting contrary to the convex case, where agents with convex preferences that do not
prefer extremes and they prefer in between values, in the First price auction BNE equilibrium is bidders i bid
and that must be highest bid so that the item is allocated to him, and the outcome is efficient. Since in the First
price items is sold to the buyer with the highest valuation of the item, this auction mechanism is Pareto efficient.
Though in theory FPA auction is distinct from the English type of auction since here bidders can only submit
one, bid and they do not know other bidders valuation and they may bid too low.
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